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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant 
for damages for injuries received by the plaintiff-appel-
lant and the damages resulting therefrom, on the 16th 
day of September, 1963, at approximately 9:15 in the 
morning, when the plaintiff-appellant tripped over ob-
structions in what is sometimes called the parking area, 
between the curb and the sidewalk proper, in Kanab, 
Kane County, Utah. The defendant, Kanab City, Utah, 
a Municipal Corporation, was the municipality involved; 
lhe defendants LaMar Bybee and Carvel Mattsson, as 
Administrator of the estate of Odell Watson, deceased 
were the owners of the property in front of which said 
obstructions were located, and California-Pacific Utili-
ties Company, a Corporation, the other defendant, was 
a tenant of the same property, and was an exclusive 
tenant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury in Kanab, Kane 
County, Utah, commencing 4 May, 1966, and running 
until the 5th day of May, 1966. At the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case, and in response to motions by each of 
the defendants for dismissal for failure to prove a prima-
facie cause of action, these motions were verbally 
granted, under provisions of Rule 41-B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, upon the ground that on the facts pre-
sented by the plaintiff and the law applicable thereto, 
plaintiff had shown no right to relief as against any of 
the defendants. A written judgment of dismissal, dated 
the 10th day of May, 1966, was entered by the Clerk of 
the Court on the 16th day of May, 1966. A motion for a 
new trial was filed, and argued on the 2nd day of Aug-
ust, 1966. Although no written order was entered on that 
date, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District Judge, 
announced that he was overruling and denying the mo-
tion for a new trial. Thereafter, this matter has come 
to an appeal on the appeal of the plaintiff and appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the judg-
ment of dismissal and of the order overruling and deny-
ing the motion for a new trial, and desires that the Su· 
preme Court order the matter to be remanded and tried 
before a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and appellant believes that the facts 
are as follows: That prior to the 16th day of September, 
1963, the plaintiff-appellant was steadily employed as a 
cook in the Trail's End Cafe, in Kanab, Kane County, 
Utah, and was making $12.00 a day. That on the 16th 
day of September, 1963, at approximately 9:15 in the 
morning, the plaintiff, accompanied by a daughter, a 
grandchild, and a son, in a vehicle driven by the son, 
went to the Kanab Branch of the First State Bank of 
Salina. That this bank is housed in a building adjacent 
to the property in question, being east of the property 
in question. That there was an alley between the build· 
ing in which California-Pacific Utilities Company was 
housed, being the property in question, and the Kanab 
Branch of the First State Bank of Salina, and this prop· 
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ty was owned by the defendants LaMar Bybee and Car-
vel Mattsson, the Administrator of the Estate of Odell 
Watson, deceased, which gave the exclusive possession 
of the property owned by the defendants LaMar Bybee 
and Carvel Mattsson, Administratior of the Estate of 
Odell Watson, deceased, to California-Pacific Utilities 
Company, and placed on California-Pacific Utilities Com-
pany a duty of care and maintenance of the area on 
which said building was located. In approaching the 
bank, the son of the plaintiff drove down the street going 
from East to West, the bank being located on the north 
side of the street, and parked the vehicle in which the 
plaintiff and her companions were riding directly in 
front of the California-Pacific Utilities Company offices 
which are in the building on the property in question 
and in Kanab, Utah. The son of the plaintiff parked the 
vehicle parallel, and within an inch or two of the curb. 
The plaintiff, in approaching this area, was riding in the 
right front seat of the vehicle. Her son was driving. Her 
daughter and the grandchild were in the rear seat. The 
vehicle was a station wagon. LaMar Bybee and Odell 
Watson, now deceased, had purchased this property 
several years prior thereto, in approximately 1957, and 
at the time of their purchase, there was a canopy ex-
tending over the sidewalk to the curb, that had been 
used to house a service station. The uprights were ad-
jacent to the street, and rested upon two cement blocks 
which extended above the curbing approximately six 
inches, and said blocks were approximately 18 inches 
in each direction. The vehicle stopped approximately 
between the two blocks. At the time of the trial, said 
blocks had been removed by the defendant Lamar Bybee. 
In relation to the curb there was the customary four to 
six-inch lip on the curb, and the blocks were against this 
cement lip of the curb, and north thereof, toward the 
building. There had also been a water pipe that came 
up immediately adjacent to the east side of the east 
block in approximately the center thereof, and after 
Purchasing said building, the defendant LaMar Bybee, 
and Odell Watson, now deceased, removed the canopy 
for Lhcir purposes and left the blocks. The water pipe 
1\ as cut off approximately the height of the blocks, 
or slightly lower. On the 16th of September, 1963, at the 
time of the injury, these blocks and water pipe were in 
this condition and had been there for several years. 
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The plaintiff left the automobile by the right front door 
turned and shut the door, and stepped toward the bani~ 
in a diagonal direction, and stumbled and fell, and be-
came unconscious, and the injuries resulted. After the 
accident, plaintiff determined she had fallen over the 
east of said blocks, or the water pipe in connection there-
with, and did not at the time of the accident have any 
idea what she had fallen over. Permanent injuries and 
damage have resulted and there are considerable doctor 
bills and loss of wages, in addition to pain and suffering. 
Within thirty days of this accident, a damage claim 
was duly submitted to Kanab City in accordance with 
Title 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, same being 
dated 3 October, 1963 In addition attempts were made 
to serve same on Mr. Bybee, and eventually he was 
served, although not within any 30-day period. On Oc· 
tober 22, 1963, a special meeting of Kanab City Council 
was held, at which the notice that was later served up· 
on the plaintiff, stated that notice was given and that 
a quorum was present. The notice dated 24 October, 1963, 
stated that at said meeting the claim of Margaret Mc· 
Allister date October 3, 1963, was rejected on the grounds 
that Kanab City was not negligent; that any injuries 
that were received by the plaintiff were the sole and 
exclusive result of the negligence of the plaintiff and 
that without admitting negligence on the part of 
Kanab City, if any such negligence could be found, the 
contributary negligence of the plaintiff precluded her 
recovery. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS OWED A DUTY TO 
MAKE PREMISES SAFE TO PLAINTIFF AND 
OTHER PEOPLE CROSSING SAID AREA. 
It goes without saying that Kanab City owes a duty 
to all people to keep its streets and sidewalks free from 
unsafe, dangerous, defective and obstructive conditions. 
Authority fo1· this statement starts with Utah Code An· 
notated 195:3 in Section 10-8-8, giving the city authori1~ 
to lay 01tt, f_'stablbh, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, 
grade, pnve, or ot!'len\'i~~e improve streets, alleys, av~­
nuPs. 1Joi.Ju1 01rds, sicle\\ alks, parks, airports, pub!IC 
grouncb, and irLlY vacate the sa11•c 01· any parts by ordi-
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nance, and is extended in Section 10-8-11 Utah Code 
I 
Annotated, 1953, pertaining to streets, encroachments, 
lighting, sprinkling and cleaning: 
"They may regulate the use of streets, alleys, ave-
nues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks, and public 
grounds prevent and remove obstructions and en-
croachments thereon, provide for the lighting, 
sprinkling and cleaning of same." 
This is a question of a duty of a city to its citizens 
or any other persons to make the streets safe and re-
move obstructions. There is a long history of cases and 
judgments against cities in the state of Utah. There is 
a comprehensive discussion of liability of a city to re-
move obstructions and to keep its streets free from un-
safe, dangerous, defective or obstructive conditions, in 
the case of Niblick vs. Salt Lake City, 111 P. 2d 800, 100 
Utah 573. While this particular case held that the stat-
ute did not pertain to negligence of its employees in 
driving vehicles and items of that nature, there is a tre-
mendous amount of authority quoted pertaining to ob-
structions and negligence in keeping this condition from 
coming into existence. This case cites the two statutes 
cited above, and in addition the statute requiring a 
claim to be presented, as being the basis of cities' lia-
bility in cases of this nature. In this case, the case of 
Alder vs. Salt Lake City is cited, 231 P. 1103, 64 Utah 568. 
"There is a well-recognized exception to the gen-
eral rule of immunity in cases involving the mainten-
ance of care of public streets, and it is generally held 
that municipalities are liable for negligence in failing 
to keep the avenues of public travel in safe condition 
and repair. It is argued that a similar exception should 
be made in the case of the maintenance of public 
parks, playgrounds, etc. The exception in the case of 
streets is founder upon public policy and expediency, 
and is recognized in this state by legislative act." 
The case of Niblock vs. Salt Lake City, cited above, 
then goes on to a considerably comprehensive discussion 
by the Utah State Supreme Court setting forth the dut-
ies of a city in keeping its public ways clear, and cites 
a great many other cases as authority, including, but 
not limited to Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 
P. 570, Morris vs. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 373, 35 Utah 474, 
and no end of cases from other jurisdictions. 
Next comes the question as to whether or not the 
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duty of a city to keep a street free from obstructions ex-
tends to the area between the curb and the sidewalk 
which is often referred to as the parking, in which th~ 
cement blocks and the pipe referred to above were lo-
cated. The inclusion of this area has been very definite-
ly defined as part of the city's liability in the case of 
Hunt vs. Tooele City, 334 P. 2d 555, 8 Utah 2d 323. In 
this instance, a judgment for damages was sustained 
by the Utah State Supreme Court against Tooele City 
for injuries received in stumbling on a slight break in 
a curbing, where there was an unusual defect and rise 
between the curbing and the parking area. In this par-
ticular case, as to the liability of the city for negligence 
of leaving an item of this nature, Utah State Supreme 
Court quotes Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which has been cited above, and in addition quotes the 
Niblick vs. Salt Lake City cited above; also the case of 
Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, 159 P. 2d, 149, 108 Utah 
266, and in quoting the case of Bills vs. Salt Lake City, 
109, P. 745, 37 Utah 507, makes the following statement: 
"A person using a public street has no reason to 
apprehend danger, and is not required to be vigilent, 
to discover dangerous obstructions, but he may walk 
or drive in the daytime or nighttime, relying on the 
assumption that the corporation whose duty it is to 
keep the streets in a safe condition for travel have 
performed that duty, and that he is exposed to no 
danger from its neglect." 
And in relation to a contributory negligence question 
arises makes the following statement: 
"What is meant is that he needs exercise ordin-
ary care only to detect and avoid obstructions or de-
fects that are obvious, and that may and ought to be 
detected, and hence avoided by the exercise of ordin-
ary care .... '' 
Consideration of the Hunt Vs. Tooele City case very def· 
initely should deter one from any thought that the park· 
ing is not included in the streets, and that the duty of the 
city does not cover the parking as well as the sidewalk 
and the street proper. 
Pertaining to the landowner and the tenants, there 
is no question as to their liability for maintaining a haz· 
ard of tlli:; nature. In the first place, this hazard was 
created by the affirmative act of the landowner, as set 
forth in the testimony of Mr. Bybee, beginning on Page 
7 
J "13 of the transcript on Line 19, and running to Page 
l ±l:i, Line 18. This testimony through this portion shows 
LJ1at at the time the alterations were made and the can-
r,py was taken down, Bybee and Watson owned the 
building and California-Pacific Utilities Company was 
in possession of it, under a 10-year lease from 1959 to 
1DG9, the lease having been entered in evidence as ex-
hibit 7, and the taking it down was paid for by Watson 
ai1J Bybee, was requested by the City and the State 
noad Commission in making street alterations, and that 
tne premises were under a lease requiring the tenant 
to take care of the area. When a trap of this nature was 
created at that time under a lease agreement in exist-
enl'.e at that point, there is no question that all three 
defendants were participants in and parties to creating 
the trap that caused the damage to the plaintiff. In ad-
dition, the Revised Ordinances of the City of Kanab, 
l!Y59, adopted by the City Council of Kanab, Utah, on 
the Sth day of September, 1959, which were in effect in 
1 %:\ at the time of the injury, contains the following 
paragraph: 
"18-1. Obstruction of Sidewalks. It shall be un-
lawful for any person owning, occupying or having 
control of any premises, to place, or permit to be 
placed, upon the half of the sidewalk of the half of 
the street next to such premises: 
"l. Any broken ware, glass, filth, rubbish, re-
fuse matters, ice, water, mud, garbage, ashes, tin 
cans or other like substances. 
"2. Any vehicle, lumber, wood, boxes, fencing 
building material, dead trees, tree stumps, merchan-
chse or other thing \vhich shall obstruct such 
public street or sidewalk or any part thereof, or the 
fret< use and enjoyment thereof, the free passage 
over and upon the same, or any part thereof, with-
out the permission of the City Council." 
Certainly the cement blocks come under the all-inclus-
i1 e item, "or other thing". Certainly the duty is placed 
li(it only upon the property owner, but upon the occupant 
as well, or anyone else having control. 
Tlw State Supreme Court has taken the attitude in 
llw past that after a city has been liable on an obstruc-
tion of this nature, under circumstances where a build-
:w is under control of an occupant or a tenant, the city 
inay collect its damages from the person having control 
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of same, in the case of Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, 159 
P. 2d 149, 108 Utah 266. This was a situation in which a 
person had been injured by catching a heel in a grating 
that was normally in the sidewalk for the purpose of 
covering a hole for putting merchandise into the base-
ment of a building. The Schubach defendants were ten-
ants of a portion of the building only, but apparently 
had control of this particular obstruction. The individ-
ual that was injured had collected from Salt Lake City. 
In this particular instance, the Supreme Court of Utah 
upheld a judgment against the tenant Schubach for 
maintaining this obstruction, with the statement that 
anyone who obstructs a sidewalk in such a manner that 
it is not for the benefit of the city or any other individ-
ual, must do so in such a manner that he incommodes 
the public as little as possible, with the further provi-
sion that he shall excavate and install such structures 
on the condition that he "shall use more than ordinary 
care." In addition, the court holds, 
"This duty is a continuing one, appurtenant as 
it were to the land, and liability for failure in duty 
cannot be delegated, nor can it be terminated ex-
cept by transfer of the land or surrender of the priv-
ilege of maintaining the structure." 
In the case at hand, the lease transfers the duty of 
maintaining the structure, but certainly under this case 
of Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, it carries with it the ad· 
ditional duty of maintenance of the adjoining sidewalk 
and street premises. Also, in the case at hand, we have 
not only a question of negligence in maintaining the 
structure, but gross negligence in removing a portion of 
the structure and leaving an item that should have 
been removed at the time the structure was removed. 
In the Schubach case there is no end of authority hold· 
ing similar conclusions. In the Schubach case, the city 
had paid a judgment to one Sabey, the person who had 
been injured, and the issue was whether or not it could 
be recovered from the owner of the abutting property 
or the tenant. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
allowed recovery from the tenant in this particular in· 
stance, intimating that it \Vas based upon the exclusive 
use and control of the item that caused the damage, and 
indicating that had the use and control not been passed 
on in a manrier by agreement and practice, the proper· 
ty owner would have been liable. However, the court also 
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111<1dc a finding that if the defects causing the injury ex-
,,.tLd at the time of making the lease, the owner does 
not thereby escape liability, but simply allowed the 
liability to be passed on through the owner to the ten-
ant because of the nature of the use and control. 
Many cases hold that violation of a law or ordinance 
1s negligence in itself and there is no question that an 
orclinanCl' of Kanab City was violated by all defendants 
(''.Cept Kanab City and that Kanab City tolerated the 
1 ioiation. In Skerl vs. Willow Creek Coal Co., 69 P.2d 
302, 92 Utah 474, this was set out and has been ampli-
fied by many other cases. In the Skerl vs. Willow Creek 
Coal Company case there are quoted several other cases 
as foilows: "When a standard of duty or care is fixed 
by lavv or ordinance, and such law or ordinance has ref-
erence to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as 
a mattH of necessity, a violation of such law or ordi-
nance constitutes negligence." 
In this Kanab case we have the ordinance and the 
1 iPiation and the condonation of the violation. Of course, 
the defendants will claim that the ordinance was not 
pz1c;sed for the benefit of the plaintiff. However, this is 
not true. For what reason would such an ordinance be 
passed except to make the streets safe for everyone who 
used them, including the plaintiff? 
Also, see the recent case of Klafta vs. Smith, 404 
P.2d 659, 17 Utah 2d 65, in which a similar situation was 
ruled negligence as a matter of law and the only issue 
1.o be tried was damage and the action of the trial court 
in so ruling was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Point II 
EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PER-
FORM SAID DUTY AND THIS WAS NEGLIGENCE 
ON THE PART OF EACH OF SAID DEFENDANTS. 
It goes without saying that it is admitted by all par-
ties that at the time of the accident, the blocks were still 
in the position that they had been in when Mr. Bybee 
had removed the canopy at the request of the City and 
1 lw State Road. Also, plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, which 
show,, as having been received in evidence on Page 14 
(;I the transcript, was admitted without objection by any 
ilt>k11d::mt, and was identified as a picture taken a few 
da.\ :-: ,irter the 16th of September, 1963, and on Page 13, 
I.me 12 of the transcript is identified as correctly repre-
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senting the area that he was photographing at the time 
the picture was taken, and that it was taken shortly af. 
ter the 16th of September, 1963, in front of the Califor-
nia-Pacific Utilities office. There is no question as to 
the representations of the photograph being correct. 
Under these conditions, there can be no argument as to 
the existence of the hazard at the time of the accident. 
Point III 
PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED AS A DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF FAIL URE OF DEFEND-
ANTS TO PERFORM SAID DUTY. 
There can be no question that the plaintiff was in-
jured as a result of the fall in the area on the 16th day of 
September, 1963. By the time the claim was filed with 
Kanab City, which was 3 October, 1963, plaintiff had 
been back to the area and concluded that she had fallen 
over the cement block or the pipe, and the claim so 
states. There is also no question that at the time of the 
fall, plaintiff did not know what she fell over, but made 
a determination at a later date as to the cause of her 
fall, and as to leaving the car and closing the door, her 
testimony is to the effect that her back was turned, and 
that she turned and fell as she started toward the bank, 
which would have been in a diagonal direction from the 
car. In cross-examination, the plaintiff very definitely 
stated that she did not know what she fell over, and has 
never made any other statement at anytime, including 
depositions and any other item. Under these conditions, 
the claim to Kanab City, which was offered in evidence 
as an exhibit by the defendants and which was admitted 
in evidence by the plaintiff, regardless of the notes of 
the transcript, and which was received in evidence, one 
must conclude that she determined after the fall, the 
item that caused her to fall. After all, the lady was un· 
conscious and was in the hospital for several days. 
This raises the question as to whether or not a per· 
son can go back to a scene after several days and deter-
mine what he fell on, and then claim damages as a re· 
sult of same when he did not know what he fell on at the 
time. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in 
several instances indicated not only that a person can 
go back and determine what he fell on, but that a rea· 
sonable assumption of what caused damage can be col· 
lected upon. 
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A most interesting case has recently been decided 
in this field by the Utah State Supreme Court, and which 
rnay come before the State Supreme Court again. This 
is the case of Spencer vs. Salt Lake City, 412 P. 2d 449, 
17 Utah 2d, 362, in which a claim against Salt Lake City 
was thrown out by a trial judge on a city's motion to 
dismiss claim because the claim that had been present-
ed to the city was insufficient by its failure to state the 
amount of damage which was claimed. The action of 
the trial judge was reversed by the State Supreme Court 
on March 18, 1966, holding that the only thing the claim 
lacked was the amount of damages claimed, and that 
since the city was given the essential facts which would 
enable it to make a proper investigation, the claim was 
satisfactory. This case was later tried before a jury in 
Salt Lake County and during the early summer of 1966, 
a Salt Lake County jury awarded damages in the amount 
of $29,347.78. In the jury trial of this item, a special form 
of verdict was submitted as follows: 
"Question No. 1. Did Frances Spencer trip over a 
defect in the sidewalk. Answer - Yes. 
"Question No. 2. If she did, was she negligent in not 
seeing the defect? Answer - No. 
"Question No. 3. If so, was the negligence a princi-
pal cause of the injury to her? Answer - Not ans-
wered. 
"Question No. 4. If it was not or she was not negli-
gent, what amount of money would fairly and ade-
quately recompense Frances Spencer for any and 
all injuries and damages she sustained as a result 
of her tripping over the defect in the sidewalk. An-
swer - $29,437.78." 
During the trial of this particular matter, it devel-
oped that Frances Spencer did not know what she had 
fallen on at the time she fell, and went back to the same 
place at a later date and determined that she had fallen 
over a defect in the sidewalk. Of special significance is 
the case of Hunt vs. Tooele City preciously cited as 
TH P. 2d 555. 8 Utah 323. In this particular matter, in 
a dissenting opinion, Justice Henroid quotes a cross-ex-
amination to the effect that at the time the lady fell, 
~ht• was watching, but she didn't see the hole that she 
Put her foot in, and that after she had fallen she looked 
back and determined what had tripped her, and in this 
particular instance, the Supreme Court of the State of 
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Utah, with one dissent, endorsed the damages that were 
paid. In the Utah Report of the Hunt vs. Tooele City case 
011 page 327 in 17 Utah 2d, there is a picture of the ho!~ 
in Tooele City that Mrs. Hunt stepped in. A comparison 
of the two photographs, to-wit, the Hunt vs. Tooele City 
photograph, and the photograph of the cement blocks 
in the case now at hand, same being Exhibit "l", shows 
that if hazards can be comparative, the hazard in Kanab 
was rnuch greater. Also, in the Supreme Court Reports, 
on Tom vs. Days of '47, Inc, 401, P __ 2d 946, 16 Utah 2d 
386, there is not even a definite finding as to what caused 
the plaintiff, Frank Biil Tom, to fall off the grandstand. 
He had been a participant in a rodeo and went to par-
ticipate but got there too late, and they let him and his 
wife and children in for nothing. Mr. Tom and two teen 
age sons took seats in the top row of the bleacher sec-
tion. The wife and the younger children were two or 
three ro\vs below them. During the performance a 
Brahma bull broke through a fence that was later de-
termined to be unsatisfactory under the use to which 
it was being put, and charged into the crowd, and Mr. 
Tom was found injured at the bottom of the area he 
had been sitting on: 
"Although there was no direct evidence as to 
what caused plaintiff to fall, there was evidence 
that when the bull charged, the crowd stampeded; 
that plaintiff was not drunk at the time! that he 
was seated on top of the bleachers; that the top of 
the bleacers had no back support; that plaintiff was 
found lying unconscious on the ground, his head 
evidently having struck concrete. The circumstances 
outlined above were sufficient from which the jury 
could reasonably conclude and find the plaintiff's 
fall \Vas caused by the si...trge of the frightened 
crowd as il t~"ied to escape when the bull charged 
the fence." 
When I compare this statement with the admitted 
fact situation of lVfrs. McAllister returning to the scene 
and determining that she had fallen over these cement 
blocks or pipe, and the Hunt vs. Tooele City, and the 
Spencer v~. Salt Lake City cases, there is no question 
that the maUc1· should kwe been submitted to a jury, 
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and lhat if a jury had found for the plaintiff, they would 
]lave been justified in doing so. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING CASE 
FROM THE JURY. 
This case was taken from the jury by the trial court 
at the end of plaintiff's case without evidence being of-
fered by the defendants. The question of contributory 
rvidence was not considered by the court, and had it 
been, the cases are legion that this is a question for the 
jury to consider. The language of the judgment Dismis-
sal is, " ... upon the ground that on the facts presented 
by plaintiff, and the law applicable thereto, plaintiff 
had shown no right to relief as against any of the de-
fendants ... ". Under these conditions, and in the light 
of the cases quoted above, and in view of the court's 
duty to take the plaintiff's uncontested evidence, and 
give it the strongest possible import, there is no ques-
tion that there was sufficient evidence presented to go 
to the jury on the question of proximate cause and dam-
ages. Under these conditions, the court very definitely 
should have put the defendants on their proof and al-
lowed the case to go to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the plaintiff-appellant claims that the 
trial court has erred and shown bias and prejudice in 
dismissing the case under the circumstances, inasmuch 
as giving the strongest possible construction to the 
plaintiff's testimony, in view of the cases that have been 
cited above, there was more than sufficient evidence to 
go to a jury, and a great deal more evidence than in 
many of the cases that have been upheld by the Utah 
:c;upreme Court in judgments for plaintiffs; and that the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court with in-
structions to enter a new trial. This is especially true 
11 hen we consider that we allow people to be convicted 
of criminal acts on the basis of circumstantial evidence; 
when we consider that we have allowed the collection 
hy Frank Bill Tom, where no one knows how he got 
pushed off the bleachers - whether the crowd did it or 
whether he went to sleep and fell off, and when we con-
sider that in both the case of Spencer vs. Salt lake City 
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and Hunt vs. Tooele City, they were similar types of ac-
tions against a city for defective sidewalk and curb 
conditions, and that in each case after the injury the 
plaintiff ascertained what caused the fall. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Patrick H. Fenton, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
